In an effort to protect its computer systems from malevolent actors, the U.S. government has developed a series of intrusion-detection and intrusion-prevention systems aimed at monitoring and screening traffic between the internet and government systems.
With EINSTEIN 3, the government now may seek to do the same for private critical infrastructure networks.
This paper explores the implications of Stuxnet-like worms for the United States and specifically for the U.S. Department of Defense. It discusses what makes cyber defense difficult and outlines the bureaucratic and legal issues and boundaries in the United States that can compound the problem. It then offers some conclusions and recommendations for how the United States can confront the increasing risk posed by such threats.
An interesting article in China Defense Daily lays out the China´s point of view about the characteristics necessary for “a highly effective command system for cyber war mobilization”.
ENISA has published the first EU report ever on cyber security challenges in the Maritime Sector.
The Congress has given the U.S. military a "green light" to conduct offensive military activities in cyberspace.